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A DIFFERENT VIEW OF PRIVACY
ALBERT W. ALSCHULER*
Professor Countryman's Orgain Lecture1 is an important addition
to the growing literature of privacy. It presents a comprehensive pic-
ture of the threat that modem technology and organization pose to
our sense of control over basic information about ourselves. Professor
Countryman calls for action: We cannot leave the cause of privacy to
the forces of laissez faire. I fully agree.
I believe, however, that Professor Countryman's lecture shares one
defect with a number of lesser studies. It focuses too much of its energy
on the mechanisms that now exist for compiling and distributing in-
formation, and not enough on the concept of privacy that it seeks to
advance. In my view, Professor Countryman's study, like other recent
writing in the field, does not put first things first. Before one can sen-
sibly decide what to do about proliferating data banks, one must
reach some judgment concerning the extent to which an individual
should be able to control the use of information about himself. A pre-
cise, substantive concept of privacy should precede any procedural
solution, and Professor Countryman's own concept of privacy is, in
my view, too often implicit rather than carefully thought out and
expressed.
The result, when it comes to solution, is a proposal that is essen-
tially backward-looking. It seeks to recapture the era before the com-
puterized personal dossier and the national data bank came into
existence. Professor Countryman urges that except in cases of "actual
need for a vital public purpose," data banks containing personal in-
formation should be abolished. Because the technological revolution
that surrounds us has diminished our sense of privacy, Professor Coun-
tryman apparently sees technology, and organization itself, as our
villains.
In my judgment, this proposal and others like it tend to go both
too far and not far enough. By focusing on today's mechanisms of
sharing information, they protect substantive privacy only haphaz-
ardly. At the same time, these proposals would impose gratuitous
hardship on persons whose right to use and share information Pro-
fessor Countryman does not challenge.
* Professor of Law, University of Texas; BA., Harvard, 1962; LL.B., Harvard, 1965.
:Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the
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Consider just one example. Under Professor Countryman's pro-
posal, a department store contemplating an extension of credit ap-
parently would not have access to the files of a consumer credit bureau.
Professor Countryman would not, however, require the store to extend
or deny credit in darkness or on the basis of an applicant's grooming
and personal appearance. The store would apparently be free to seek
information from the customer himself, from the references that he
provided, and from other individuals and commercial institutions as
well. As Professor Countryman puts it, the store would be "left to
[its] own devices."
Under this regime, I suspect that most department stores would
quickly adopt a "long form" credit application that would itself in-
vade the customer's privacy. The form would require a substantial
amount of time and energy for the customer to complete. Following
this paperwork, the store would delay each application for a number
of weeks while it contacted the customer's references and "verified"
the information that he provided.
The customer would repeat this process with every credit appli-
cation, for there would be no mechanism by which he could "waive"
his right to privacy and permit the accumulation of personal data by
a credit bureau. (If there were such a mechanism, it would be difficult
to prevent an information gatherer from automatically requiring a
"waiver" as a condition of extending credit. The present situation
might therefore be rapidly duplicated.)
The central point is one that Professor Countryman recognizes:
abolishing the consumer credit bureau would be inefficient-not only
for the commercial institution but for the customer as well. Professor
Countryman's proposal would tend to consume the consumer in paper-
work and delay and discourage him from seeking services that he
would otherwise obtain and value.
Professor Countryman argues that we must rid ourselves of "the
misconception that whatever is efficient is desirable," and it is true
that there are many situations in which free men must sacrifice effi-
ciency to the cause of human dignity. But efficiency, though not the
end of human existence, is a value nevertheless. I believe that we
should receive something in return for our trade. If the invasion of
privacy turns out to be the same in the end, it might as well be done
efficiently.
I do not deny that there would be some gain to privacy under
Professor Countryman's proposal. For one thing, there might be a
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gain in the accuracy of the information used by department stores and
other commercial institutions. I am not, however, entirely sure. A
system which looked to the customer himself as the primary source of
credit information would make it more difficult for a commercial
institution to learn a third person's lies about him-at the same time
that it made it easier for the customer to lie successfully about him-
self.
Thus there would not necessarily be a net gain in the accuracy of
information under Professor Countryman's proposal, but there might
be a gain of a different sort. A financial institution could demand as
much information about a customer's past under this proposal as it
demands today; but if the customer himself were the primary source
of this information, the inaccuracies in the final report would probably
tend to favor the consumer rather than harm him. Whether our sys-
tem of jurisprudence formally recognizes the fact or not, harm to the
consumer is likely to be more painful than harm to the financial
institution. A shift in the direction of the inaccuracies might there-
fore be desirable.
In addition to the danger of inaccuracy, a centralized data bank
poses a danger that information given for one purpose may be used
for another-for example, that friendly statements to a lady from the
Welcome Wagon may, without the customer's knowledge or consent,
be considered in passing on a credit application a few weeks or a few
years later. Professor Countryman does not, however, rest his opposi-
tion to data banks primarily on the danger of inaccuracy and on the
difficulty of confining access to information to the people we wish to
have it. Even if the accumulated information were accurate and even
if the rules limiting access to this information could be fully enforced,
Professor Countryman would see the data bank as a threat to privacy.
It is with this last proposition that I disagree. In my view, Professor
Countryman has confused the medium with the message.
Under Professor Countryman's proposal, it would apparently be
necessary to establish an impartial agency to review each accumulation
of information to determine whether it served an "actual need for a
vital public purpose." This agency might have an administrative
power to order the destruction of files that did not meet its standards;
or more likely, the agency might propose suitably detailed legislation
to Congress or the state legislatures. (I note, in passing, that Professor
Countryman's solution seems inconsistent with his earlier statement,
[Vol. 49:872
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"With the present state of knowledge of the contents and the uses of
dossiers, it seems unlikely that we can effectively define either the
'legitimacy' of the 'need' permitting access, or what information is
'relevant' to that need. Even less can we define the balance to be struck
between the 'need' and a desirable preservation of privacy." Professor
Countryman would strike the balance somewhat differently from the
people he criticizes, but he attempts essentially the same task. I think
that Professor Countryman was right the second time around, and
that the task should be attempted.)
My own approach to the problem of safeguarding privacy would,
however, be somewhat different. In one respect, I would carry Profes-
sor Countryman's proposal farther. My initial inquiry would not be
what information should be contained in a data bank (a particular
means of storing and coordinating information), but what information
an individual or institution should have in making a particular deci-
sion. In other words, I would ask the substantive question first.
As early as 1949, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts made it an
"unfair educational practice" for an educational institution "to cause
to be made any written or oral inquiry concerning the race ... color
or national origin of a person seeking admission .... -2 1 would take
this legislation as my model and direct my hypothetical "privacy
agency" (which I would borrow from Professor Countryman) to focus
on each of the major tasks for which public and private groups now
accumulate personal information-such tasks as deciding whether to
extend or deny credit, deciding whether to hire or fire, investigating
crime, census-taking, and so forth. In each instance, the agency should
ask what sort of information ought to be available in performing the
task; and as Professor Countryman notes, the inquiry should encom-
pass not simply the relevancy of the information, but the extent to
which this information is properly viewed as private.
The final proposals of the agency might be either negative or
affirmative in form: "An employer shall not make or cause to be made
any inquiry into the race of an applicant for employment, into arrests
or criminal proceedings involving the applicant which were not fol-
lowed by convictions, into an applicant's political associations or be-
liefs [with an exception, perhaps, for a few "national security" posi-
tions and for organizations like the Republican Party and the NAACP
which have avowed political purposes] ... ." Or, "A person or organi-
2 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151C, § 2 (1958).
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zation which employs more than five persons may make only the fol-
lowing -inquiries concerning a person seeking employment as an
unskilled laborer ......
The resulting "privacy code" would be neither short nor simple,
and it would undoubtedly be necessary to draw some difficult distinc-
tions. I believe, however, that an agency that studied the current
practices of various public and private investigators, the forms cur-
rently used to gather personal information, and the character of the
specific problems that emerged could arrive at a consensus that would
better reflect our concern for privacy than today's passive system of
laissez faire.
Once the substantive question of how much personal information
should be available in performing each task had been settled, it would
be necessary to turn from the "message" to the "medium." The fact
that a department store might be entitled to know a customer's weekly
income before deciding whether to open a charge account for him
would not mean that the store could learn this information by install-
ing an electronic eavesdropping device in his place of business. Some
techniques for gathering and sharing information should be, and
some have been,3 outlawed; and other techniques should surely be
confined and regulated.
Whether the computerized data bank should be prohibited for
most purposes seems to me to turn on the extent to which it augments
the dangers of inaccuracy and of access for unintended purposes, and
on the extent to which these dangers are offset by the affirmative uses
of the data bank in sharing information. I am not nearly so pessimistic
as Professor Countryman concerning the ability of governmental reg-
ulation to minimize the dangers.
Suppose, for example, that whenever a person or organization
secured information from a consumer credit bureau, a statute re-
quired notice to the consumer of the identity of the information-user
and of the information that he had obtained. Professor Countryman
argues that this regulation might be evaded; a person who did not
receive the required notice would usually be unaware that his rights
had been violated. We could, however, test the credit bureaus' report-
ing practices through our own "dummy" requests for information;
and even without this stratagem, it seems likely that any regular, sys-
tematic pattern of violation would eventually be discovered. Our sanc-
tions could probably be made severe enough that the credit bureaus
8 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (Supp. V, 1970).
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would be unwilling to run 'the risk. Moreover, if necessary, we could
move beyond the private lawsuit as our sole enforcement mechanism.
We could, for example, physically inspect and test the credit bureau's
computers to ensure that they had been programmed to give the re-
quired notice. Indeed, we might be able to enlist computers to per-
form this task. My purpose, of course, is not to argue for a particular
form of regulation, but simply to illustrate the existence of a range of
regulatory techniques short of the large-scale file-burning that Profes-
sor Countryman proposes.
In setting forth a scheme for resolving privacy problems different
from Professor Countryman's, I have made the point that I started out
to make. We should employ a two-step analysis, asking first what in-
formation is "none of the information-user's business" and then what
methods should be available to collect, store, use, and communicate
information that the user is reasonably entitled to have in making a
particular decision. This scheme does not carry us very far, of course,
toward an ultimate solution, and it may be appropriate to add a few
words concerning the character of the inevitable balancing process-
whether that process is focused on the information that should be con-
tained in a data bank as Professor Countryman proposes, or on the
information that a person or group should have in making a particular
decision as I suggest.
Unlike Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Griswold v. Connecticut,4
I do not value my privacy as much as the next man-at least when the
next man is Professor Countryman. An individual's concern for pri-
vacy is itself a private and subjective thing. Professor Bruno Bettel-
heim has written, "[P]rivacy is not a universal, absolute good, but
belongs very much to a particular style of life-to a historical period,
a social class-and is thus culture bound."5 Professor Bettelheim notes
that what one generation could discuss only in the carefully guarded
privacy of a darkened psychoanalytic treatment room, another gener-
ation sets forth in family magazines and on the screen. The ideal of
one generation may be a separate bedroom and bathroom for each
child, but when the child grows up, he may choose a commune where
a dozen people sleep, love, and live together in a single room.
Because our concern for privacy is ad hoc, subjective, changing,
and culture-bound, the extent to which an individual should be able
to control the use of information about himself cannot be determined
4381 U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
5 Bettelheim, Some Comments on Privacy 2 (unpublished manuscript on file at the
University of Texas Law Library).
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"in the large." No universal solvent can, in a few words, resolve all
privacy problems. It is for this reason that I have suggested that a gov-
ernmental agency approach the problem of safeguarding privacy "in
the specific," by focusing on the most common uses of personal infor-
mation and by evaluating the propriety of each use. In this way, we
may be able to give effect to general cultural sentiments concerning
privacy-sentiments that, in Justice Holmes' phrase, may lie tangled
beneath the surface without losing their validity. Professor Country-
man's test of "actual need for a vital public purpose" would, in my
view, confuse our inquiry rather than aid it.
Professor Countryman writes, "The only hope for substantial
protection of privacy against the computerized dossiers ... is that they
not exist-at least that they not exist on the present scale." Professor
Countryman does not, however, describe what a "computerized dos-
sier" is, and his statement could have far-reaching implications.
For example, Professor Countryman and I were both opposed to
the confirmation of G. Harrold Carswell as a Justice of the Supreme
Court. The battle over the Carswell nomination began, for all prac-
tical purposes, when a newspaper reporter discovered an interesting
piece of personal information about Judge Carswell. A full generation
before his nomination, Judge Carswell had said, "I yield to no man
... in the firm, vigorous belief in the principles of white supremacy,
and I shall always be so governed."
The reporter found this statement in a newspaper "morgue,"
which, of course, is an old-fashioned word for data bank. The news-
paper files had not been placed on a computer tape, but I cannot be-
lieve that the newspaper's reliance on a manual filing system could
make a critical difference. I, for one, am not distressed that the gov-
ernment had not combed through these files a dozen years earlier and
discarded all material not shown to serve an actual need for a vital
public purpose. Judge Carswell lost control over a bit of information
about himself, but the right of privacy of a public figure with respect
to his public statements should, I think, be very limited. Indeed, I
believe that it would be unconstitutional to forbid a newspaper from
maintaining a "morgue" unless the government agreed that it served
an actual need for a vital public purpose.
A newspaper itself is a data bank, full of personal information,
yet a newspaper surely could not be required to justify itself in terms
of Professor Countryman's standard. My point is that file-burning is
not very different from book-burning; the difference between a file
[Vol. 49:872
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and a book is simply a printing press. There are, of course, instances
in which the media should be restricted in the interest of preserving
privacy, and there are instances in which file-compilers should be re-
stricted as well. In both situations, our traditional concern for open-
ness should argue for caution and restraint.
The history of the Carswell nomination illustrates one other
point. The uses of information are contingent and unforeseeable. To-
day's idle curiosity may become tomorrow's actual need for a vital
public purpose. Even the Massachusetts statute forbidding educational
institutions from asking the race of applicants for admission has had
an unforeseen impact. At the time that this statute was passed, the
perceived danger was that schools and colleges would discriminate
against the members of minority races. More recently, many schools
have favored applicants from minority races-in the interest of secur-
ing greater balance among their student bodies, in the interest of ad-
vancing the status of members of these races in society at large, and in
recognition of the possibility that traditional admission criteria may
not adequately measure the abilities of many minority group students.
This new educational policy has been hampered by the legislatively
decreed absence of racial inquiry on college admission forms. Of course
the policy of the Massachusetts statute can still be defended, and the
current approach of the educational institutions can be criticized.
Nevertheless, the legislative restriction has had an effect that was prob-
ably unintended. This restriction has impeded a program that the
legislators themselves might have considered valuable, had they thought
about it.
The standard of "actual need for a vital public purpose" seems
to me, not only to underrate the virtues of information-sharing, but to
oversimplify a difficult problem. I doubt that even actual need for a
vital public purpose could justify some compilations of information-
for example, any compilation achieved through non-governmental
electronic surveillance. Yet even curiosity might justify a compilation
of the published speeches of a public figure. It is necessary to focus,
not only on the character of the need, but on the character of the
information and the methods used to obtain it. Among the factors
which we should consider are the relevancy of particular information
to particular tasks, the extent of the need for this information, the
extent to which the information is commonly viewed as private, the
ability of particular techniques to supply the information accurately,
the availability of substitute techniques, the extent of the intrusion
1971]
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produced by each technique, the likelihood of use for unintended pur-
poses, whether the individual has in any way consented to the intrusion
or the information-sharing, and the character of the consent that he
has given.6
A paper of this sort inevitably contains more criticism than praise.
The extent of my agreement with Professor Countryman may there-
fore not be apparent. My goal is certainly not to minimize the dangers
that Professor Countryman has set forth in graphic detail, nor to den-
igrate the need for prompt governmental action.
It has been suggested that the computer may expand man's abil-
ity to know and reason to greater extent than the automobile ex-
panded his mobility; and this development, hopeful though it is,
poses a serious and ever-growing threat to privacy. We confront a dif-
ficult problem of planning with, I think, very little idea of how to go
about it.7 Professor Countryman's remarks have prompted me to for-
mulate one tentative approach to this important task, and I hope that
they will have the same effect on others. As Professor Countryman
says, the time for inquiry is overdue. We must begin the job now if
the future is to be governed by our actions rather than our defaults.
6 See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
7 See generally NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCENCES, TECHNOLOGY: PRoCEssEs or AssmsmN,
AND CHOICE (1969).
